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I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages are quasi-criminal in nature, seeking not to
compensate the complainant but to punish and deter the defend-
ant.' Because a punitive damages award need not be related to
the claimant's actual damages or need only be "reasonably" re-
lated to the compensatory damage award, permitting a punitive
damages case to go to the jury involves a significant risk of an
excessive or otherwise errant verdict. Punitive damages are not
deemed excessive as easily as an ordinary compensatory award,
which can be measured more closely against the evidence of actual
damages. Thus, punitive damages claims require more frequent
and more calculated exercise of judicial control.
Punitive damages have become commonplace in products liabil-
ity litigation. By adding a punitive damages claim, the plaintiff
can convert relatively simple litigation into a significant threat to
the defendant. Cynics and commentators have referred to puni-
tive damages claims as attempts to circumvent the "American
Rule" which generally bars an award of attorneys' fees to a pre-
vailing party in litigation.2
1. See Haugen & Tarkow, Punitive Damages in Minnesota. The Common Law and Develop-
ments Under section 549.20 of the Minnesota Statutes, I1 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 353, 357-59
(1985).
2. The "American Rule" on recovery of attorneys' fees in civil litigation requires
parties to bear their own expenses, including attorneys' fees, unless a statute or contract of
[Vol. I11
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss2/2
84 JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
The addition of a punitive damages claim also carries the poten-
tial of turning the litigation into a mere "strike suit, ' 3 much like
purported class actions alleging securities fraud.4 The strike suit
potential of securities class actions, however, is muted by local
rules regarding the posting of security for costs5 and by the prereq-
uisites to a class action contained in rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Moreover, rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that fraud be pleaded with particularity,
6
preventing plaintiffs from filing actions and then conducting dis-
covery to determine whether a cause of action for fraud exists.7 In
the relatively younger field of punitive damages, few such institu-
tional restraints exist.
Due to this lack of institutional restraints, punitive damages
claims must be kept in proper perspective through the judge's ex-
ercise of discretion and intelligent case management. The judge,
at a number of critical stages in the litigation, determines whether
punitive damages will fulfill their true purpose of providing legiti-
mate punishment and deterrence or whether punitive damages
claims are interposed merely for confusion, prejudice, or settle-
ment value.
the parties specifically provides for recovery of attorneys' fees. The rule distinguishes
American practice from that of England, where a prevailing party will normally be
awarded the costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the litigation. The "American Rule" is
widely followed in the United States and has been recently reaffirmed by the United
States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240 (1975). The rule is also followed in Minnesota courts. See Fownes v. Hubbard Broad-
casting, Inc., 310 Minn. 540, 246 N.W.2d 700 (1976).
3. "Strike suit" is a popular phrase to describe actions brought for the purpose of
obtaining a settlement based not on the merits of the claims advanced but on the cost or
embarrassment that defending the action would bring. In the context of class actions,
strike suits also include actions brought to obtain a large settlement for a few parties in
order to prevent the further prosecution of the action.
4. According to the United States Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), nuisance or "strike" suits produce the possibility of
vexatious litigation by "frustrat[ing] and delay[ing] normal business activity of the defend-
ant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit," id. at 740, and permitting "a plaintiff with a
largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of other people." Id at
741.
5. See, e.g., E.D. WASH. R. 23 (defendant may demand security for costs and charges
from plaintiff who is an out of state resident or foreign corporation).
6. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "in all averments
of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally."
7. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt, 101 F.R.D. 715 (W.D. Okla. 1984)
(counterclaim defective for vagueness and non-particularity which alleged only generali-
ties and not particular facts and circumstances).
19851
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This Article focuses on the special problems that punitive dam-
ages claims create in the management and trial of a products lia-
bility case and the approaches used by courts to deal with these
problems. Many of the case management decisions the court
makes in punitive damages cases are based, at least in part, on the
the judge's "impression" of the punitive damages claim. This Arti-
cle explores this judicial "impression" and explains it to the extent
it is capable of explanation. The Article also explores how the
court exercises the close control over punitive damages awards re-
quired by the Minnesota and federal appellate courts.
This Article does not attempt to provide a judicial perspective
on management and trial of products liability cases generally and
many issues raised in products liability actions will not be dis-
cussed. A punitive damages claim may, however, add an addi-
tional level of complexity to a products liability action, and
specialized procedures may be required by the court in these
actions."
With that perspective in mind, this Article is relatively concise,
since punitive damages cases are not significantly different from
other products liability and tort actions. Punitive damages actions
are managed using essentially the same pretrial proceedings, dis-
covery, and calendaring of actions for trial, and many of the same
evidentiary and trial issues are presented.
II. OVERVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES CASES
Punitive damages have long been available under Minnesota
law9 and were recently made available to products liability plain-
tiffs. 10 In 1978 the Minnesota Legislature enacted a statute codify-
8. See generally Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1982); Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litiga-
tion: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (1983).
9. See, e.g., E.H. Boerth Co. v. LAD Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635, 646 (D. Minn. 1979)
(punitive damages awarded in conjunction with breach of contract); Caspersen v. Web-
ber, 298 Minn. 93, 99, 213 N.W.2d 327, 330-31 (1973) (punitive damages awarded in
assault case); Kirschbaum v. Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206 N.W. 171, 173 (1925)
(lower court erred by instructing jury in assault case that plaintiff was necessarily entitled
to punitive damages); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200-02, (Gil. 128, 142-44) (1862) (sus-
taining punitive damage award based on improper levy of attachment upon property by
sheriff).
10. See, e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. deniedsub
nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); see generally Haugen & Tarkow,
supra note 1, at 360-61; Comment, Punitivte Damages in Products Liability Actions: A Look at
Newly ExtendedDoctrine-Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), 7
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 185 (1981).
[Vol. I11
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss2/2
A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
ing the common law standards developed by courts addressing
punitive damages issues." Minnesota Statutes section 549.20 es-
tablishes the burden of proof that a party seeking punitive dam-
ages must meet,' 2 the standard of conduct justifying an award of
punitive damages,1 3 the factors to be considered in determining
the appropriate amount of punitive damages,1 4 and standards for
imposing punitive damages on a principal for the misconduct of
an agent.' 5 Under the Erie doctrine,' 6 Minnesota law applies to
most products actions tried in federal court in Minnesota.
In addition to the guidelines established by section 549.20, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has dictated that trial courts should ex-
ercise "close control over the imposition and assessment of punitive
damages.' 7 The trial judge's role in a punitive damages case. is
not limited to deciding narrowly drawn issues submitted by pre-
trial motion or presiding over a trial to the ultimate factfinder,
usually a jury. In both state and federal courts, the trial judge
11. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, § 4, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 838 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 549.20 (1982)); see also Haugen & Tarkow, supra note 1, at 365-92.
MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1982) provides:
Subdivision 1. Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon
clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a willful indif-
ference to the rights or safety of others.
Subd. 2. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or
principal because of an act done by an agent only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the
act.
Subd. 3. Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those factors
which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the serious-
ness of hazard to the public arising from the defendant's misconduct, the profit-
ability of the misconduct to the defendant, the duration of the misconduct and
any concealment of it, the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and
of its excessiveness, the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of
the misconduct, the number and level of employees involved in causing or con-
cealing the misconduct, the financial condition of the defendant, and the total
effect of other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a result of
the misconduct, including compensatory and punitive damage awards to the
plaintiff and other similarly situated persons, and the severity of any criminal
penalty to which the defendant may be subject.
12. MINN STAT. § 549.20, subd. I (1982) (clear and convincing evidence).
13. Id (willful indifference to the rights and safety of others).
14. Id, subd. 3; see supra note II (text of section 549.20).
15. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 2.
16. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17. Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn.
1982) (quoting Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages.- Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HAST.
LJ. 639, 670 (1980)).
19851
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exercises an increasingly broad range of responsibilities that may
broadly be characterized as "managing" a case. 8 Although the
desirability of this role for the judiciary has engendered debate,
the fact that judges perform a managerial role cannot be seriously
disputed. 19 Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires the judge to perform case management activities.
20
The judge's managerial functions may be exercised in docket
management, during the consideration of motions submitted to
the court for decision, by the court's sua sponte exercise of its in-
herent powers, and by its involvement in pretrial conferences and
settlement conferences. 2' The court's involvement in these aspects
of case management may vary from case to case and from judge to
judge, but will be present in some way in every case. In punitive
damages cases, these managerial activities may be especially
important.
One facet of judicial decisionmaking and case management that
is largely undocumented, and rarely admitted, is the inevitable
role of an "impression" or early subjective evaluation of the valid-
ity and relative strength of a punitive damages claim.2 2 This "im-
pression" may be based upon the oral and written submissions of
the parties, the court's experience in similar matters, an accurate
or inaccurate understanding of the applicable law, and various
subjective and often unidentifiable influences.
2 3
Judges' impressions of the validity of punitive damages claims
play an important role in determining the subsequent course of the
proceedings. Early in a case, the judge determines whether a puni-
tive damages claim appears appropriate. The judge does not
18. See Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981). See generally Schwarzer, ManagItg
civil litigation. the trial judge's role, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978). Judge Schwarzer urges "that
judges intervene in civil litigation and take an appropriately active part in its manage-
ment from the beginning." Id at 402.
19. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
20. Rule 16(b) was amended in 1983 to require, except in certain circumstances, that
the judge enter a scheduling order within 120 days after the complaint is filed "that limits
the time (1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; (2) to file and hear motions;
and (3) to complete discovery." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). According to the advisory com-
mitee notes, this rule "is necessary to encourage pretrial management that meets the needs
of modern litigation." Id advisory commitee notes.
21. See Resnik, supra note 19, at 378-79.
22. The nature of a judicial "impression" is more substantial than mere intuition or
"hunch." See Hutcheson, TheJudgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Deci-
sion, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
23. See id
[Vol. I11
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make an ultimate factfinding decision as to whether punitive dam-
ages should be awarded in the case, but may make a threshold
determination of whether litigation of the punitive damages issue
is appropriate. The process may be compared with the judicial
determination of "probable cause" in a criminal case. 24 The court
essentially asks: Is this a "real" punitive damages claim? Is this
claim being advanced sincerely by the plaintiff, or is it included in
the case for in terrorem or settlement value? Is it a "reflex" claim,
or is it grounded in the defendant's conduct? Is discovery sought
to determine and obtain evidence of improper conduct or is im-
proper conduct alleged in an attempt to expand the scope of
discovery?
Since the process for preliminary determination of the propriety
of a punitive damages claim is not formally accepted, there is no
stated jurisprudence to guide a court in making this early determi-
nation. The courts infer a standard, based upon all information
available to the court, including the court's experience, to form an
early impression. The judge essentially determines whether a par-
ticular set of facts constitutes a punitive damages case based upon
the court's confidence that it can recognize a punitive damages
case when it sees one. 25
Because this judicial impression may significantly affect deci-
sions in a punitive damages case, trial counsel should attempt to
mold the court's impression at an early stage in the proceedings.
The content and tone of oral argument and the briefs and other
written submissions to the court should be directed, at least in
part, at nurturing the court's impression of the punitive damages
issues.
24. Although the "probable cause" analogy is applicable to much judicial decision-
making, it is especially appropriate to the decision of punitive damages claims because of
their quasi-criminal nature. See generally Haugen & Tarkow, supra note 1, at 357-59.
25. This approach, although not recognized in this particular context, has ample ju-
dicial recognition, beginning no later than Justice Stewart's famous statement regarding
hard-core pornography: "But I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). This jurisprudence has also been followed by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v. County of Wash-
ington, 304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981) (whether an organization practiced religion and
therefore deserved a property tax exemption); State v. Hoyt, 286 Minn. 92, 174 N.W.2d
700 (1970) (whether books were hard-core pornography).
1985]
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III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS DURING EARLY PRETRIAL STAGES
A. In'tial Motions
1. Motion to Dismiss a Punittve Claim
Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized the avail-
ability of punitive damages in products liability actions, 26 the fed-
eral court is rarely allowed to dismiss a punitive damages claim for
failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. If, however, the claim is poorly pleaded
or if punitive damages are not recoverable as a matter of law, a
motion to dismiss the claim might be appropriate.
Circumstances where punitive damages are not recoverable as a
matter of law are limited. For example, in Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing
& Sheet Metal Co., 27 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that puni-
tive damages are not recoverable in strict liability in tort where the
only damage involved is damage to property.2 8 Accordingly, dis-
missal of a punitive damages claim would be appropriate in a
property damage products liability case alleging only strict liabil-
ity in tort. 29 If, however, negligence, breach of warranty, or mis-
representation claims were present in the case, the punitive
damages allegation would be proper and not subject to dismissal.
2. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is available in punitive damages cases. The
standard for obtaining summary judgment, however, is an onerous
26. See, e.g., Giyc, 297 N.W.2d 727, noted in 4 HAMLINE L. REV. 351 (1980); see also
Comment, supra note 10.
27. 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982).
28. Id at 228. The court stated that:
Although the nature of the plaintiff's injury is not always listed as a factor in
determining how to assess punitive damages ... it may reasonably be taken into
account in deciding where punitive damages will be allowed .... Where that
injury is limited to property damage, the public interest in punishment and de-
terrence is largely satisfied by the plaintiff's recovery of compensatory damages.
Punitive damages represent an extraordinary measure of deterrence.
Id. at 229. Similarly, punitive damages are not available in contract actions in Minnesota.
Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 297
(Minn. 1980).
29. Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228-29. The court's decision in Eisert does not clearly indi-
cate whether punitive damages are recoverable under theories other than strict liability in
tort where the only damage is to property. The court did not overrule its earlier decisions
in which punitive damages for property damage were awarded under different theories. It
makes little theoretical sense, however, to bar punitive damages under one theory and
permit their recovery under a theory bearing a different name but requiring proof of es-
sentially the same facts.
[Vol. I1I
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one, and a summary judgment disposing of such claims will rarely
be granted. The Eighth Circuit has stated that summary judg-
ment is an extreme remedy that should not be granted unless the
party is entitled to judgment beyond all doubt.30 That court has
directed that summary judgment is "not to be granted unless the
movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as
to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not
entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances."'3' The
Minnesota Supreme Court has also followed a restrictive view on
granting summary judgment and applies a stringent standard in
its review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment.32
Notwithstanding the stringent standard applied to summary
judgment motions, there are punitive damages cases in which sum-
mary judgment is appropriate. Counsel must bear in mind the
standard of rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which permits a motion for summary judgment to be granted only
if the factual record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."'33 The moving party must show the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact, and must be prepared to re-
spond to any issues raised by the opposing party.
After the parties have engaged in discovery it may be possible to
determine, as a matter of law, that insufficient facts exist to permit
submission of the punitive damages claim to the jury. This deter-
30. City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denzed, 399 U.S. 905
(1971). The court held that:
Summary judgment would be entered only when the pleadings, depositions, affi-
davits, and admissions filed in the case show that [except as to the amount of
damages] there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id at 223 (citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464 (1962)).
31. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209-10
(8th Cir. 1976).
32. See, e.g., Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 223, 230, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646
(1974) (any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved in
favor of finding that the fact issue exists); Schmidt v. Smith, 299 Minn. 103, 107, 216
N.W.2d 669, 671 (1974) (before granting summary judgment, court must consider all
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits to see if any
material issue of fact exists); Abdallah, Inc. v. Martin, 242 Minn. 416, 424, 65 N.W.2d 641,
646 (1954) (court must consider all pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, ad-
missions, and affidavits; great care must be exercised to permit the litigant a right to trial
where there is reasonable doubt as to the facts). See generally Pielemeier, SummatyJudgment in
Minnesota: A Search for Patterns, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 147 (1981).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under rule 56(c), a court will base its determination of the
existence of a material fact on any pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, ad-
missions, or affidavits. Id
1985]
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mination would result in entry of a partial summary judgment. 34
If punitive damages are legally available under only one theory,
however, it may become clear that that theory is subject to sum-
mary judgment, thereby removing the issue of punitive damages
from the case.
3 Partial Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court
to enter summary judgment in favor of either party on one or
more claims in an action. 35 Although this motion may be appro-
priate in punitive damages cases, the moving party bears the same
onerous burden as in a motion for summary judgment on all is-
sues. 36 Despite the limitations on its availability, partial summary
judgment is the most effective tool for attacking a punitive dam-
ages claim.
A motion for partial summary judgment may be used to obtain
dismissal of a claim for punitive damages that are not recoverable
as a matter of law. In this role, the motion for partial summary
judgment is essentially identical to a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim.
3 7
Partial summary judgment also permits the court to determine,
based on the entire factual record, whether punitive damages are
wholly inappropriate, even though they may be properly pleaded.
Partial summary judgment should be available in this circum-
stance to permit the court to discharge its obligation of exercising
"close control" over punitive damages claims. 38
Partial summary judgment motions provide a good example of
a situation in which a judicial impression 39 may be important to
the result. If the court has formed an impression that a punitive
damages claim is proper, then it should not grant a partial sum-
mary judgment dismissing it. Conversely, if the court has formed
an impression that the punitive damages claim is not valid or not
brought for a proper purpose, the partial summary judgment stage
34. See ifra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
35. FED. R. COv. P. 56. Rule 56(c) states that a claimant may move for summary
judgment "in his favor upon all or any part [of his claim]." Id Rule 56(b) applies the
same standard to defending parties. Id
36. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. I I
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of the proceedings may be a logical place to remove the claim from
the case.
B. Class Action Certification
Courts have recently considered the potential use of class actions
for handling mass disaster cases generally and, in particular, puni-
tive damages claims in such cases. The class certification proce-
dure presents unique problems in a punitive damages/products
liability action, but also provides a solution to some of the difficult
policy issues surrounding punitive damages claims in multiple
plaintiff cases.
The class action has historically been regarded as ill-suited and
inappropriate for mass tort litigation.40 Courts have considered
the many unique fact issues of a claimant's action sufficient to war-
rant denial of motions to certify a class of mass disaster plaintiffs.
The development of litigation involving hundreds of virtually
identical products liability claims is prompting a general reconsid-
eration of the class action as a device to foster the just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of mass disaster litigation.
4'
Punitive damages claims have played a central role in this re-
consideration. The existence of a punitive damages claim in a
products liability case produces the potential for inconsistent ver-
dicts, even when claims are based on an identical defect. The pu-
nitive damages claim presents a Janus-like danger of imposing
multiple penalities on a party for a single act or course of conduct
and the converse risk that an early judgment winner will recover a
bonanza while later judgment winners will be limited to an award
of compensatory damages. Since the punitive damages award fo-
cuses on the. defendant's conduct, and not the plaintiff's, it is ar-
gued that there is little justification for inconsistent awards of
punitive damages.
Despite courts' continued reluctance to certify classes of tort
40. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig. v.
A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982), ceri. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983) (class
certification in mass tort actions has been denied by many courts, especially where defend-
ant allegedly acted negligently for an extended period of time); In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Rau v. Stoner, 459 U.S. 988
(1982) (vacating order certifying class which improperly enjoined state plaintiffs from pur-
suing pending state actions on compensatory and punitive damages issues).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule I states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
shall be "construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." Id
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plaintiffs, 42 commentators have urged that such classes be al-
lowed. 43 Some courts, however, have certified classes of tort claim-
ants. 44 One court has recently certified a massive class action
solely on the issue of punitive damages. 45 The presence of signifi-
cant punitive damages issues in a multiple plaintiff products liabil-
ity action may make the court more inclined to consider
certification of a class action.
C Non-Class Consolidation and Consohdation for Trial
Even if a case is not certified as a class action under rule 23, it is
possible for multiple litigation involving punitive damages claims
related to a single product to be consolidated for pretrial discovery
or for trial. Courts have long recognized that consolidation proce-
dures offer significant efficiencies in the management of some pu-
nitive damages cases.
Discovery of a manufacturer's records may be expensive and
time-consuming for both the plaintiff and the defendant. In many
cases, the parties will present the same experts. Consolidation for
discovery may permit the discovery in twenty cases to be only mar-
ginally more expensive than it would have been in any one case.
This efficiency is required by sound judicial management policies
and is consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that
civil litigation be conducted as efficiently and inexpensively as
possible.
46
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has frequently
consolidated products liability cases involving punitive damages
42. In re Northern Dit. of Cal, Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d at 852-
54.
43. The Honorable Scott 0. Wright, who presided over the federal court cases arising
from the collapse of the skywalk in the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel in 1981, and
Joseph A. Colussi wrote a useful article discussing the advantages of using class actions in
mass tort litigation. See Wright & Colussi, The Successful Use of the Class Action Device in the
Management of the Skywalks Mass Tort Litigation, 52 UMKC L. REv. 141 (1984); see also
Seltzer, supra note 8, at 61; Note, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and
Ef/i'encvy, 47 ALBANY L. REv. 1180, 1180-81 (1983); Note, Class Certifwation in Mass Accident
Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REv. 1143 (1983).
44. The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York certified a class action of over 40,000 claimants who claimed
to be injured by the use of Agent Orange, a chemical defoliant, in the Vietnam War. In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The action was
subsequently settled. See generally Note, The Punitive Damage Class Action: A Solution to the
Problem of Multiple Punishment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 153.
45. See In re "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(class of over 700 members certified).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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claims for management of pretrial proceedings by a single judge.47
The Judicial Panel's willingness to consolidate products liability
actions, however, is limited. The Panel has denied consolidation
of multiple actions involving the same product.
48
Consolidation of pretrial proceedings before a single judge is
also effective for cases within a single judicial district. The United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota has used this
approach to manage a large number of products liability cases in-
cluding punitive damages claims relating to the Dalkon Shield in-
trauterine contraceptive device. 49 The actions were consolidated
for pretrial purposes before one judge, and subsequently assigned
to all judges in the district for trial. Although coordinated man-
agement of products liability actions involving punitive damages
claims will often be initiated by the court, counsel may move the
court for consolidation. 50
In addition to consolidation or coordination of pretrial proceed-
ings, it is possible for multiple products liability cases to be consoli-
dated for trial.5' This procedure has not been used extensively but
may offer some efficiencies. Consolidation for trial may solve the
problem of one party recovering a disproportionate share of any
47. See, e.g., In re Richardson-Merrell Inc., 533 F. Supp. 489, 491 (J.P.M.D.L. 1982)
(45 actions pending in 22 districts concerning birth defects resulting from ingestion of
Bendectin consolidated); In re Celotex Corp. "Technifoam" Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F.
Supp. 1077 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977) (transfer of action to join previously consolidated claims
ordered to "best serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of the litigation").
48. See, e.g., In re Rely Tampon Prods. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 1346 (J.P.M.D.L.
1982) (denying consolidation of 92 actions noting that discovery in many cases was well
advanced and that pretrial proceedings were completed in some actions); In re Asbestos &
Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977)
(noting that where necessary, voluntary sharing of discovery had already occurred). De-
nial of transfer in these cases was based on the almost unanimous opposition to transfer
expressed by the parties and the predominance of factual questions unique to each action.
49. See, e.g., Junkermeier v. A.H. Robins, Civ. No. 3-82-1811 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 1983)
(initial pretrial order ordering, inter alia, consolidation of 20 cases). Thejunkermeter court
ordered consolidation, pursuant to rule 42(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"[b]ased upon the necessity for our courts to provide access to justice for all parties in a
reasonably expeditious and economic manner, and ihl the interest of the efficient adminis-
tration of justice." Id. (pretrial order at 3).
The judges of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota provide
for reassignment of "companion cases" to the judge to whom the first similar case was
randomly assigned. See Amended Order In re. Assignment of Cases, July 1, 1982 (D.
Minn.).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
51. See, e.g.,Junkmeier, Civ. No. 3-82-1811 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 1983) (initial pretrial
order).
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recovery. Consolidations for trial may unduly complicate the liti-
gation, however, especially if the underlying liability cases present
significant individual fact disputes.
D. Third-Paroy Practice
Punitive damages cases rarely present difficult questions con-
cerning third-party practice. As in many products cases without
punitive damages claims, motions to implead additional parties
for contribution or indemnity are common. Although contribu-
tion and indemnity are probably not available with respect to the
punitive damages portion of a defendant's claim, this rule does not
prevent impleader for the compensatory portions of the claim.
As a practical matter, third-party complaints are frequently
served in punitive damages actions. Service occurs in part because
of the inherent complexity of these cases and the relatively large
amount of compensatory damages frequently involved. A defend-
ant faced with punitive damages claims may also find it strategi-
cally desirable to join third parties in order to diminish the
apparent culpability of the defendant's conduct.
E Insurance
Insurance issues may impinge on the trial of a punitive damages
action, although these issues will normally be resolved prior to
trial. If questions exist as to the insurer's coverage of punitive
damages claimed in an action, a liability insurer should commence
a declaratory judgment action to resolve those questions. If a de-
claratory judgment action is brought, the coverage question will
be resolved at an early stage in the litigation. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has expressed its disapproval of insurers trying a
case and then raising the coverage dispute.5 2 If the, insurer does
not bring a declaratory judgment action it may be necessary or
desirable for the defendant to retain separate counsel to represent
its interests which are arguably not insured. This second attorney
representing a party to the action may complicate the mechanical
52. See, e.g., Prahm v. Rupp. Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979). The court
recognized that the third-party defendant insurance company would face a conflict of
interest at trial because the company could be forced to take opposing positions. First, the
insurer would have to defend its insured against the plaintiff's claim. Second and concur-
rently, the company would have to defend itself against the insured's claim. The court
suggested, therefore, that the insurer should instead bring a declaratory judgment action
prior to trial to determine the coverage dispute. Id at 391 & n.2.
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aspects of the trial, but generally will not have a significant
impact.
Insurance issues also exist in the background in many punitive
damages cases. Coverage for punitive damages may be disputed,
either on public policy or insurance policy language grounds.5 3
These coverage disputes are also normally resolved prior to trial.
The presence of a valid punitive damages claim may greatly en-
hance the likelihood that the case will be settled before trial. Be-
cause Minnesota has recognized an insurer's obligation to pay
excess damages if it fails to settle a case within the policy limits,5"
an opportunity to settle a case for an amount less than the avail-
able insurance limits must be carefully considered by a liability
insurer. In cases where an award of punitive damages is likely, the
potential for excess liability provides a tremendous incentive to set-
tle within the policy limits.
IV. DISCOVERY
Discovery disputes unique to punitive damages cases usually re-
late to special evidentiary issues discussed in this section. Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the scope of discov-
ery generally as relating to admissible evidence or materials that
may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 55 Thus, discov-
ery disputes may require a preliminary ruling on the potential
scope of admissibility at trial.
A. Net Worth and FKnancial Information
Discovery of net worth and other financial information is con-
53. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr.
693 (1979) (punitive damage award traditionally nullifies all insurance coverage); Beaver
v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 11. App. 3d 1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (1981) (public policy
prohibits insurance against liability for punitive damages arising out of one's own con-
duct); Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. 1981) (in most situa-
tions insurance coverage for punitive damages is void as against public policy). But see
Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980) (pub-
lic policy does not preclude insurance coverage for punitive damages assessed against a
corporation based on respondeat superior). See generally Ellis, Punitive Damages i Iowa Law:
A Critical Assessment, 66 IowA L. R'Ev. 1005 (1981); Note, An Overview of the Insurability of
Punitive Damages Under General Liability Policies, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 203 (1981).
54. See Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384 (Minn. 1983) (court requires
insurer to exercise good faith in considering offers to compromise); see also Continental
Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 1976) (insurer's
bad faith rejection of insured's offer to settle within policy limits exposes insurer to judg-
ment in excess of limits).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
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troversial. The controversy exists not because of the burden of col-
lecting the information, but because of the sensitive nature of the
information and the risk of dissemination. In the absence of ex-
traordinary circumstances, discovery of financial information is
generally allowed in punitive damages cases.
56
The most effective means of seeking relief from discovery di-
rected solely at punitive damages issues is to seek a protective or-
der pursuant to rule 26(c). 57 There is no fixed rule for determining
whether protective relief is appropriate. Courts balance the dis-
covering party's need for information against the burden or other
harm that would be borne by the party to whom the discovery
requests are directed.
Parties occasionally claim that discovery of net worth and other
financial information should be deferred until a prima facie show-
ing of entitlement to punitive damages is made. 58 Since this ap-
proach requires a preliminary determination of the plaintiff's
punitive damages claim, this limitation is not generally ordered.
Postponement of discovery of net worth and other financial in-
formation may be appropriate in cases where bifurcation of the
punitive damages issues is ordered. Courts have generally recog-
nized their power to defer discovery on issues ordered to be tried
after threshold issues are tried.59 Although discovery is usually de-
ferred to obviate discovery which may ultimately prove unneces-
sary,6° the deferral may be just as appropriate in a damage context
because of the potential sensitivity of the information sought. Dis-
covery of net worth and financial information usually requires the
production of only a few documents. For that reason, the judge
may defer financial information discovery without unduly delay-
56. See, e.g., Thoresen v. Superior Court, 11 Ariz. App. 62, 461 P.2d 706 (1970); Coy
v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 373 P.2d 457, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962).
57. Rule 26(c) allows the court, upon motion and for good cause shown, to "make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
58. See, e.g., Leidholt v. District Court, - Colo. -, 619 P.2d 768 (1980) (requires
showing of a reasonable likelihood that issue of punitive damages will be submitted to jury
for consideration); Breault v. Friedl, 610 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (requires
showing of factual basis for punitive damages).
59. See, e.g., Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry., 424 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
60. See, e.g., Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980) (rules
allow "deferral of costly and potentially unnecessary discovery and trial preparation on
other phases of the case pending resolution of preliminary despositive issues"); see also El-
lingson Timber Co., 424 F.2d 497.
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ing the second part of a bifurcated trial.6'
B. Confidentialiy
Punitive damages claims may make otherwise undiscoverable
matters discoverable. To the extent this information is confiden-
tial or sensitive, an appropriate protective order limiting its dis-
semination will be routinely granted pursuant to rule 26(c)(7) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 62 The court expects the par-
ties and counsel to stipulate to these matters, and many protective
orders are entered upon stipulation.
V. FINAL PRETRIAL AND MOTIONS
A. Motions in Limine
Motions in limine are frequently used in products liability
cases. 63 The particular evidentiary problems that arise in punitive
damages cases and products liability cases are discussed as a trial
issue below. Each of those problems may, however, be raised in a
motion in limine.
Motions in limine will generally not be granted on routine evi-
dentiary questions, particularly those seeking exclusion of broad
classes of evidence.6 A judge's aversion to motions in limine is
well-grounded in human nature. The motion requires the judge to
decide an issue, which might not otherwise have to be decided, at
an abnormally early stage in the proceedings. 65 Even experienced
61. Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D. 2d 265, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975). Even if a trial delay
occurs, such a delay will be compensated by "(1) the protection of defendants from harass-
ment by discovery of their net worth in cases where plaintiffs [have not yet proven] a cause
of action for punitive damages and (2) by the time saved in barring such discovery in cases
where plaintiff cannot prove that he is entitled to punitive damages." Id. at 264, 368
N.Y.S.2d at 913.
62. Rule 26(c)(7) allows the court to make an order "that a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be dis-
closed only in a designated way." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
63. These motions include any motion for a preliminary ruling on an evidentiary
question. The motion can be offensive, to obtain a ruling that certain evidence will be
admissible, or defensive, for a ruling that evidence not be admitted. Motions in limine
should only be used in conjunction with a request for an order directing other parties not
to disclose to the jury the existence of information subject to an in limine ruling.
64. See, e.g., Miller v. B-B Distrib. Co., 79 F.R.D. 219, 223 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (blanket
exclusion of evidence not practicable where defendants may not even attempt to introdute
it).
65. Motions in limine violate the "Lindberg" rule in Judge Alsop's courtroom. That
rule, as articulated by his devoted court reporter, Larry Lindberg, states: "Don't decide
them if you don't have to." The court's reluctance to grant motions in limine is paralleled
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trial judges, adept at deciding evidentiary questions when evi-
dence is offered, find it difficult and unnatural to make similar
decisions in such an artificial setting. This aversion is partially due
to the difficulty of deciding foundation questions at such an early
stage. The drastic relief afforded by limiting evidence in limine
will therefore be allowed only in unusual circumstances. 66
An alternative to granting a motion in limine requesting that
certain evidence be declared inadmissible is an order directing the
parties not to refer to particular evidence in arguments or in exam-
ination of other witnesses. This order would not prejudice the evi-
dentiary issue. It would also prevent premature disclosure of
information to the jury67 and permit the evidentiary issue, when
ultimately decided, to be based upon a complete record.
B. Limitations on Number of Experts
Limitations on the number of expert witnesses are frequently
appropriate in products liability cases.6 Experts rarely testify on
punitive damages issues, however, so the limitation of experts does
not often bear directly on these issues.
C Bifurcatzon of Compensatoy and Punitive Damages Issues
Bifurcation of the compensatory and punitive damages issues
may facilitate the fair and efficient handling of punitive damages
claims. Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
bifurcation of issues "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition
and economy." The Eighth Circuit has recognized the trial court's
broad discretion to bifurcate claims.
69
in other areas of law. For example, federal courts are constantly admonished not to decide
constitutional law issues if a case can be disposed of on other grounds. See, e.g., Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Federal courts may also
decline to decide pendent state claims not closely linked to the facts of the federal claim
and may dismiss pendent state claims after the federal claims have been adjudicated. See
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
66. See, e.g., Lewis v. Buena Vista Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 183 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1971). The
Iowa Supreme Court stated: "The motion in limine is a useful tool, but care must be
exercised to avoid indiscriminate application. . . . Its use should be exceptional rather
than general." Id at 200-01.
67. Limitations on the scope of an opening statement are discussed in a, section VI
(A).
68. The authority to limit experts is well-established in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
69. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957) (affirming severance of cross-claims from main action).
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Bifurcation has long been used to allow trial of liability in an
initial trial, thereby avoiding the trial of damages if no liability is
found.70 Bifurcation will normally be sought by either party to
avoid expense or by a defendant to avoid undue prejudice. Even if
a party does not move for bifurcation, the court can order bifurca-
tion sua sponte.
7
1
Bifurcation of punitive damages issues may be especially appro-
priate in products liability actions for two reasons. First, the pres-
ence of a punitive damages claim will permit introduction of
evidence that would be inadmissible in an ordinary case. 72 Sec-
ond, instructions to the jury on punitive damages claims can be
confusing both because of the different evidence admissible on the
punitive damages claims and because of the differing burden of
proof.73
The Minnesota Supreme Court has affirmed the bifurcation of
claims and issues in a case involving both wrongful death and
dram shop questions. 74 Bifurcation seems to be even more appro-
priate in punitive damages cases because of the risk of evidentiary
confusion and the differing burdens of proof.
The Seventh Circuit has recognized the right of the trial court
to bifurcate punitive damages issues from the liability and com-
pensatory damages issues in a non-products case. 75 State courts
have similarly approved the ordering of separate trials for the pu-
nitive damages issues and liability and compensatory damages is-
70. See, e.g., Nettles v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 234 F.2d 243,
247 (5th Cir. 1956) (upholding trial court decision allowing separate trials of the issues of
liability and damages). But see Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 99 F.R.D. 534 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (bifurcation denied on facts of case). The Payne court stated that:
The factors to be balanced against the convenience and economy of one trial
include the complexity of legal theories and factual proof, the risk of jury confu-
sion, and whether the advanced disposition of issues in the first trial will dispose
of or simplify the issues to be raised in the second trial.
Id at 536.
71. See, e.g., Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 44 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
928 (1966); Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 33 F.R.D. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aft'd, 344
F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965).
72. For example, net worth and financial information may be discoverable and ad-
missible due to a punitive damages claim. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
73. MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1982) requires conduct permitting the award of punitive
damages to be proven by "clear and convincing" evidence. The problems of instructing a
jury under this statute are discussed inra, section VII (C) & (D).
74. Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395, 401-02 (Minn. 1977) (dictum) (trial court must
balance convenience against possibility of prejudice resulting from severence where differ-
ence in measures of damages and availability of defenses may confuse jury).
75. See Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1978).
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sues, normally trying the punitive damages issues last. 76
VI. TRIAL ISSUES
A. Limitations on Opening Statement
The determination of whether punitive damages will be submit-
ted to a jury can rarely be made in advance of trial. Accordingly,
on occasion it becomes appropriate to restrict counsel's reference
to punitive damages, and the evidence relating to punitive dam-
ages, in opening statements.
The Eighth Circuit has specifically condemned reference to pu-
nitive damages in final argument where the trial court properly
decided not to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.
For the same reasons, reference to punitive damages in an opening
statement is inappropriate unless it appears likely that the issue
will be submitted to the jury.77 An attorney desiring to refer to
punitive damages or the proof supporting punitive damages in an
opening statement should be certain to disclose that intention to
the court so that appropriate ground rules for the trial may be
established.
B. Evidentiar Problems
1. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible in prod-
ucts liability actions that include a count for strict liability. 78
Although this evidence is not admissible to prove negligence, 79 it
may be admissible in a strict liability case.80 Evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures may be admissible to show ownership or
76. See Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 374, 393-94, 196 Cal. Rptr. 117,
129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
77. See Vanskike v. ACF Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1981).
78. See, e.g., Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 792 (8th
Cir. 1977) (subsequent warning notice sent to sales personnel held inadmissible as evi-
dence of unreasonably dangerous defective product).
79. Faber v. Roelofs, 298 Minn. 16, 20, 212 N.W.2d 856,859 (1973); seealso MINN. R.
EVID. 407.
80. See Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1983)
(withdrawal of product from market held inadmissible). But see DeLuryea v. Winthrop
Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983) (subsequent warning notice on prescription
drug held inadmissible). The Honorable Donald P. Lay's concurring opinion in Kehm
contains a complete discussion of the arguments relating to evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures. 724 F.2d at 628-30 (Lay, C.J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's
analysis on admissibility of product withdrawal).
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control;"' to show the feasibility of additional safety measures; 82 to
impeach statements regarding adequacy of prior measures or
warnings; 3 or when the measures were taken by a person other
than the person against whom the evidence is to be used.8 4
The presence of a punitive damages claim may allow a defend-
ant to introduce evidence of its subsequent remedial measures to
prove its good faith and absence of culpability. The defendant's
prompt action upon learning of a product defect supports its de-
fense that it was not recklessly indifferent to the rights of others.
2. Prejudicial Efect
Many of the evidentiary questions involved in punitive damages
claims arise from the expanded admissibility of evidence in these
actions. Although the presence of the punitive damages claim
may make evidence relevant under rule 401 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 85 the mere presence of a punitive damages claim does
not diminish the prejudicial effect some evidence intrinsically pos-
sesses. Cases with punitive damages claims are, therefore, espe-
cially likely to raise issues regarding exclusion of evidence under
rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.
8 6
3. Learned Treatise Problems
Textbooks and learned treatises are normally inadmissible hear-
say. Learned treatises may, however, have an independent basis
for receipt in evidence. They may, for example, be admissible to
establish state of the art or notice, issues of particular relevance in
punitive damages cases. In these cases, the treatises may be re-
81. See, e.g., Woolard v. Mobil Pipeline Co., 479 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1973) (subse-
quent alterations in procedures and equipment admissible as evidence of control over me-
tering station premises).
82. Sterner v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352, 1354 (8th Cir.
1975) (adequate warning label used by other manufacturers prior to plaintiff's injury ad-
missible as evidence of availability of better warning); Faber, 298 Minn. at 21, 212 N.W.2d
at 859 (subsequent changes in procedures admissible as evidence of feasibility of safer
procedures).
83. Love v. Wolf, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967).
84. Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977).
85. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable then it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
86. Rule 403 allows the court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. FED. R. EvID. 403.
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ceived as exhibits in toto. Textbooks, learned treatises, and articles
may also be admissible despite their hearsay nature when they are
offered as part of expert testimony.8 7 The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence permit the use of inadmissible evidence if it is a type reason-
ably relied on by experts in the field.88 If a learned treatise or
article is admitted solely as a basis for expert testimony, the exhibit
should be received in evidence for that limited purpose, and an
appropriate cautionary instruction should normally be given to
the jury.
. Other Incidents, Claims, or Lawsuits
Evidence of other incidents, claims, or lawsuits is generally ad-
missible to establish notice. Clearly, matters brought to the atten-
tion of the defendant prior to the sale of the product which is the
subject of the case will be admissible. A more difficult question
involves matters brought to the attention of the manufacturer af-
ter the sale, but before the accident giving rise to the case under
consideration. Admissibility of other incidents, claims, or lawsuits
during this period will depend upon the defendant's duty to warn
of the defect or recall the product during this period. This evi-
dence is particularly subject to time period limitations, and evi-
dence outside a relevant time period should not be received.8 9
5. Industry Standards
Industry standards present a difficult issue for the courts in
products liability cases. The use of industry standards to establish
a standard of conduct for punitive damages is especially trouble-
some. Standards range from those that are essentially consensual
in nature, and of minimal value in establishing a standard, to
those having the force of law by adoption in regulations. It is nec-
essary for the party offering the standards to provide a detailed
foundation concerning the standards' creation, promulgation, and
legal status.
Industry standards may be used by a defendant to show that its
conduct is prevalent in the industry. Compliance with industry
standards does not, however, establish due care.90
87. See FED. R. EVID. 703; see also MINN. R. EviD. 703.
88. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., - Colo. -, 684 P.2d 187 (1984).
89. See infra section VI(B)(6) (discussion of determination of relevant time period).
90. See Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir. 1981) (evi-
dence that manufacturer complied with federal safety standards did not preclude any
finding of recklessness no matter how egregious manufacturer's conduct had been in ignor-
[Vol. I11
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6 Time Period
A frequently disputed issue in a punitive damages trial is the
determination of a time period for assessing the culpability of the
defendant's conduct. The commencement of the time period will
usually be dictated by the facts of the case. The proper ending
date, however, is often less clear. Without question the defend-
ant's conduct may be fairly scrutinized until the product leaves the
defendant's hands. In the case of many products, however, the
product will be sold a substantial time before the incident giving
rise to the lawsuit occurs.
It is often not clear what is an appropriate date to cut off evi-
dence of the defendant's conduct. Generally, the court is con-
fronted with evidence of diminishing probative value as time
elapses after the sale. The potential prejudicial impact of post-sale
and even post-accident evidence may be significant. The court's
determination of a time period frequently turns on a balancing of
probative value against possible prejudice under rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The court must examine the purpose
of the evidence and the particular facet of the punitive damages
claim upon which the evidence bears.
7 Conduct of Trial Counsel
A plaintiff may suggest that the jury should consider the con-
duct of trial counsel in determining whether punitive damages are
appropriate. Although this question has not been settled, this sug-
gestion is probably not appropriate because the parties have a le-
gitimate right to deny liability and defend their actions in court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has intimated, however, that the
conduct of the defendant during trial may be relevant. 9' That de-
cision may permit the jury to draw inferences based on the con-
duct of a party at trial. This decision does not suggest, however,
that conduct of trial counsel is relevant.
ing tests indicating design flaws of a different nature); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297
N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. deniedsub noma. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980)
(manufacturer's compliance with federal safety test does not preclude punitive damages
award as a matter of law).
91. In Schoenecke v. Ronningen, 315 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1982), the court suggested
that the defendant's nonchalant and "almost arrogant" demeanor was relevant to the
punitive damages issue. Id at 615.
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C Cautionay Instructions
Because of the complexity of products liability actions involving
punitive damages claims, cautionary instructions are frequently
used and offer tactical opportunities to counsel. Cautionary in-
structions are especially helpful to ensure that the jury considers
evidence only for the purpose for which it is properly admitted,
and to remind the jury of the proper burden of proof or of differ-
ing standards of proof. Because of the usefulness of cautionary in-
structions in products liability cases involving punitive damages
claims, requests for such instructions will rarely be denied.
VII. SPECIAL VERDICT FORMS AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Punitive Damages Question." One-Step or Two-Step?
Punitive damages may be submitted to the jury in one of two
ways: as a single question or as two questions. Those forms are as
follows:
Single question:
1. What amount is plaintiff entitled to for punitive damages,
if any?
Two questions:
1. Is plaintiff entitled to an award of punitive damages?
Yes - No __
[If you answer question 1 above "Yes," then answer question
No. 2. If you answer question 1 above "No," do not answer the
following question.]
2. Amount of Punitive Damages $
The trial judge will usually choose one of these forms based upon
his personal preference. No siginificant difference exists between
them.
The presence of a punitive damages question or questions in a
verdict form increases the possibility of an inconsistent verdict. A
jury, for example, may find no negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, but nonetheless award punitive damages. It is difficult to
reconcile these answers, since the punitive damages award requires
a finding of willful or malicious conduct, and the negative answer
regarding the existence of negligence constitutes a finding that the
defendant did not even fail to use reasonable care.
The increased complexity of a special verdict that includes
either one or two punitive damages questions demands great care
[Vol. I1I
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on the part of the court and counsel in the return of the verdict.
One practical approach to prevent irreconcilable error is to review
the verdict returned by the jury before the jury is excused. If the
verdict appears to be inconsistent, it may be possible to remedy the
error or have the jury clarify its verdict before the jury is dis-
charged. This approach is useful and should be requested by
counsel even if the court initially indicates that the jury can be
excused.
92
B. Instructions to Jury
Charging a jury in a products liability action involving punitive
damages claims is a challenging task. Most products liability ac-
tions are submitted to the jury on multiple theories of recovery. In
some cases, punitive damages are not recoverable under all of the
theories.
93
In addition, an inherent conflict exists between the levels of cul-
pability necessary for supporting various claims. Strict liability in
tort, for example, requires only proof of a defect. Negligence or
culpability need not be proven. To recover punitive damages on a
strict liability cause of action, however, the plaintiff must establish
that the conduct of the defendant showed willful indifference to
the rights or safety of others.94 These levels of culpability must be
clearly explained to a jury to avoid confusion.
Appendix A to this Article contains a sample instruction based
on the Minnesota punitive damages statute.95 This instruction
states the substantive law of Minnesota for use in cases in the fed-
eral courts.96 A similar charge is contained in Appendix B. That
charge shows the preliminary and final instructions that would be
used in the punitive damages portion of a bifurcated trial. The
92. A recent decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals criticized release of the jury
before the jury verdict could be reconciled. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Loctite Corp., 352
N.W.2d 460, 463 (Minn. App. 1984) ("As a further safeguard against the return of verdicts
that cannot be reconciled, it would seem prudent for the trial court to forbear [sic] dis-
charging the jury until the special verdict is examined by court and counsel to determine
whether inconsistencies exist").
93. See, e.g., Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn.
1982) (no punitive damages recovery permitted under strict liability in products liability
case where plaintiff alleged only property damage).
94. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1 (1982).
95. Id § 549.20.
96. Under the Erie doctrine, Minnesota law applies to punitive damages cases in Min-
nesota federal court unless preempted by federal law. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State").
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charge is based on Minnesota law prior to the adoption of Minne-
sota Statutes section 549.20, which became effective on April 15,
1978. Appendix C contains the jury instruction that has been ten-
tatively approved for use by the Minnesota District Judges Associ-
ation for use in Minnesota trial courts.
C Burden of Proof Problems
The problem of differing thresholds of culpability for compensa-
tory and punitive damages recovery is compounded by differing
burdens of proof. Under the Minnesota punitive damages statute,
punitive damages must be proven by "clear and convincing" evi-
dence. 97 Because the balance of the case need only be proven by a
simple preponderance of the evidence, it is necessary to differenti-
ate between the two burdens of proof. As indicated above, 98 this
problem may also be addressed by bifurcating trial of the products
liability claims from the punitive damages claims.
D. Control Over the Verdict
Trial courts exercise significant control over jury verdicts award-
ing punitive damages. Although there is no fixed standard for de-
termining the excessiveness of punitive damages,99 the court may
consider whether or not the award is excessive under all of the
evidence in the case.'00 The court must consider either granting a
remittitur to reduce a verdict to a maximum reasonable size or
awarding a new trial.' 0 ' Review of excessiveness of a punitive
damages verdict may also be conducted by the court of appeals.1
0 2
97. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1; see supra note 11 (text of § 549.20).
98. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
99. Ste Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 n.1 (Minn. 1982) ("The purpose of
punitive damages is to both punish and deter according to the gravity of the act giving rise
to a punitive damage award but an award should not exceed the level necessary to prop-
erly punish and deter").
100. See, e.g., Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306, 312 (Minn. 1982) (as modified on rehearing). The court stated that in " 'de-
termining whether punitive damages are unreasonably excessive, the court should con-
sider, among other factors, the degree of malice, intent or wilfull disregard, the type of
interest invaded, the amount needed to truly deter such conduct in the future.' " Id.
(quoting Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 150-51 (Minn. 1980)).
101. See, e.g., Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (federal law
governs review of size of jury award); Warren v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373,
1379 (11 th Cir. 1982); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1374 (5th Cir. 1982).
102. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., General Motors Corp., 739 F.2d 1102, 1109
(6th Cir. 1984) ("Appellate courts can properly reverse the punitive damages award as
part of their general supervision of the size of jury verdicts").
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The willingness of the court of appeals to review punitive damages
verdicts encourages trial court judges to exercise that review as
well.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Punitive damages claims are not unique to products liability ac-
tions and many of the problems in managing products liability
actions do not stem solely from their presence. Nonetheless, puni-
tive damages claims in products liability actions present novel
problems of judicial administration, or at least make traditional
case management problems more acute. Courts are required to
exercise a high degree of control over punitive damages claims be-
cause of their volatile nature and because the purposes of punitive
damages diverge from the purposes of compensatory damages.
Punitive damages have been made available in products liabil-
ity actions only after the careful consideration of the Minnesota
Supreme Court and many other courts. Their availability in ap-
propriate cases reflects the public policy of the state. It is impera-
tive that judicial control not prevent punitive damages awards in
cases where they are warranted. Courts must therefore carefully
monitor cases involving punitive damages claims. They must exer-
cise discretion at various stages in the proceedings to insure that
punitive damages serve a proper role and do not become a source
of injustice as severe as the problems they are intended to prevent
and punish.
Appellate courts are still forming the legal principles which es-
tablish the parameters of such discretion. Until these standards
become more clearly defined, this exercise of discretion is necessar-
ily largely based on a judicial "impression" of the appropriateness
of punitive damages. The role of the advocate is to mold that im-
pression; the role of the trial court is to form it cautiously and
wisely.
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APPENDIX A
Sample Punitive Damages Charge
[Charge in Unified Trial Applying Standards
Contained in Minnesota Statutes § 549.20]
In addition to actual damages, the law permits the jury, under
certain circumstances, to award the injured person punitive dam-
ages. These damages are awarded to punish the wrongdoer for
some extraordinary misconduct, and to serve as an example or
warning to others not to engage in such conduct.
If you should find upon clear and convincing evidence that acts
or omissions of the defendant, which directly caused actual injury
or damage to the plaintiff, showed a willful indifference to the
rights or safety of others, then you may, but need not, award such
amount as you unanimously agree to be proper as punitive
damages.
"Clear and convincing" evidence means exactly what is sug-
gested by the ordinary meanings of the terms making up the
phrase. Satisfaction of this standard requires more than proof by
the greater weight of evidence but less than proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. Clear and convincing proof exists where the truth of
the facts asserted is "highly probable."
In other words, in order to answer any of questions
through "Yes," I told you that you must find that the
greater weight of the evidence supports such an answer. I remind
you that greater weight of the evidence means that the evidence
leads you to believe it is more likely that a fact is true than not
true.
But I instruct you now that in order to answer question
"Yes," you must find that clear and convincing evidence supports
such an answer. Clear and convincing evidence means that the
evidence leads you to believe it is highly probable that a fact is
true.
The conduct which justifies an award of punitive damages is
more than negligence or carelessness. In order to answer question
"Yes," you must find that defendant's conduct
amounted to action taken with willful indifference to the rights or
safety of others.
In questions through , I instructed you that
the conduct of an officer or employee, acting within the scope of
his or her employment, is the conduct of the corporation. In an-
swering question , however, the rule is different. Punitive
[Vol. I1I
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damages can properly be awarded against a company because of
an act done by an employee only if any one of the following is
proven:
1. The company authorized the doing and the manner of the
act.
2. The employee was unfit and the company was reckless in
employing him or her.
3. The employee was employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting in the scope of employment.
4. The company or a managerial employee of the company
ratified or approved the act.
In determining whether the conduct of the defendant showed
willful indifference to the rights or safety of others, and in deter-
mining the amount, if any, to award as punitive damages, you
should consider those facts which justly bear upon the purpose of
punitive damages. Those factors include the following:
1. The seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from the
defendant's misconduct;
2. The profitability of the misconduct to the defendant;
3. The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
4. The degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and
of its excessiveness;
5. The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery
of the misconduct;
6. The number and level of employees involved in causing or
concealing the misconduct;
7. The financial condition of the defendant; and
8. The total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed
upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including
compensatory and punitive damage awards to the plaintiff
and other similarly situated persons.
You should bear in mind the conditions under which, and the
purposes for which, the law permits an-award of punitive damages
to be made. You must also consider the requirement of the law
that the amount of such extraordinary damages, when awarded,
must be fixed with calm discretion and sound reason. Punitive
damages must never be either awarded, or fixed in amount, be-
cause of any sympathy, bias, or prejudice with respect to any party
to the case.
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APPENDIX B
[Preliminary and Final Instructions
in Bifurcated Trial]
Preliminary Instructions
In view of the answers to the special verdict form that you have
returned, it becomes proper that I submit to you for your determi-
nation one additional fact issue.
Your jury verdict has resolved the issues between the parties as
to whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory dam-
ages. There is in the law what is known as "punitive damages."
This type of damages may be awarded in a proper case to punish a
defendant for its wrongful act and to deter the defendant and
others from similar wrongful conduct in the future.
Whether or not this is a proper case for the award of such type
of damages and, if so, the proper amount thereof, are the remain-
ing issues to be decided by you.
In resolving those issues, you will take into consideration all of
the evidence that has already been received in the case. In addi-
tion, there will be a brief presentation of additional evidence that
will now be presented to you on these issues. We do not anticipate
that this presentation will take more than one day.
Following the presentation of that evidence, the attorneys will
have the opportunity to argue their positions to you on these is-
sues. I will give you some brief additional instructions on the ap-
plicable law, and you will then deliberate and reach a verdict on
this additional issue.
Final Instructions
Now that you have heard all of the additional evidence in the
case, and the arguments of the attorneys, it becomes my duty to
give you these additional instructions as to the law applicable to
the issue of punitive damages.
In resolving these issues, you are to consider all of the evidence
that you have heard in the case originally, together with the addi-
tional evidence that has now been received. It is also your duty to
follow the law as set forth in the original charge to you, together
with the law set forth in these additional instructions. The rules of
law previously given to you regarding your duties as jurors, what
constitutes evidence, means of evaluating testimony, and the bur-
den of proof apply to your deliberations in this part of the case
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also.I
The remaining issues in the case will be submitted to you in the
form of a special verdict consisting of two questions, the same pro-
cedure you used previously. You must answer these questions by
applying the facts as you may find them to be. I will give you the
rules of law you must apply in arriving at your answers.
[Read Verdict]
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are damages other than compensatory dam-
ages which may be awarded against a defendant to punish it for
wrongful acts and to deter the defendant and others from similarly
misbehaving in the future. The rule is this: Where the defendant's
acts, which are the subject matter of the action, are shown to have
been willful, wanton or malicious so as to indicate that it acted in
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, and if you be-
lieve justice requires it, you may in your discretion award to a
plaintiff, in addition to compensatory damages, such further rea-
sonable sum as you deem just as punitive damages.
In determining whether defendant has acted in a willful, wan-
ton or malicious disregard of plaintiff's rights or safety, you may
consider the following factors:
2
1. The existence and magnitude of the product danger to the
public;
2. The cost or feasibility of reducing the danger to an accepta-
ble level;
3. The manufacturer's awareness of the danger, the magnitude
of the danger, and the availability of a feasible remedy;
4. The nature and duration of, and the reasons for, the manu-
facturer's failure to act appropriately to discover or reduce
the danger; and
5. The extent to which the manufacturer purposefully created
the danger.
1. This instruction assumes use of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard as
used in the main case. For causes of action arising after April 15, 1978, the "clear and
convincing" standard of MINN. STAT. § 549.20 must be used. The substance of a charge
under the statute is contained in Appendix A and the jury should be given a preliminary
charge on the differing burden of proof.
2. The substantive portion of this charge also draws on pre-statute standards. In a
cause of action arising after April 15, 1978, the substantive standard for punitive damages
based upon the statute should be taken from Appendix A or C.
1985]
31
Alsop and Herr: Punitive Damages in Minnesota Products Liability Cases: A Judicia
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
350 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. II
If you find that punitive damages can be awarded, their allow-
ance and amount are within your discretion as triers of the facts.
In assessing what is a reasonable amount for such damages, you
may properly consider the character of the defendant's acts, the
nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff which the defendant
caused, or intended to cause, and the wealth of the defendant.
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APPENDIX C
JIG 195
Punitive Damages
[Standard Jury Instruction Guide Tentatively Adopted by
Minnesota District Court Judges Association]*
If you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the
defendant show a willful indifference to the rights or safety of
others, then you may, in addition to other damages to which you
find the plaintiff entitled, award the plaintiff an amount which
will serve to punish the defendant and deter others from the com-
mission of like acts.
When I say clear and convincing evidence, I mean that the evi-
dence must lead you to conclude that it is highly probable that the
defendant acted with willful indifference to the rights or safety of
others. Put another way, the evidence must produce in your
minds a firm belief or conviction that the defendant acted in will-
ful indifference to the rights or safety of others.
When I say willful indifference, I mean that the defendant acted
in deliberate disregard to the rights or safety of others.
If you determine that punitive damages should be awarded, you
should consider factors relating to the purpose of punitive damages
in determining the amount, including, but not limited to, the fol-
lowing factors:
1. The seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from the
defendant's misconduct.
2. The profitability of the misconduct to the defendant.
3. The duration of the hazard and of its excessiveness.
4. The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery
of the misconduct.
5. The number and level of employees involved in causing or
concealing the misconduct.
6. The financial condition of the defendant.
7. The total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed
upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including
compensatory and punitive damages awards to the plaintiff
and other similarly situated persons.
* Copyright (c) 1984. This instruction will appear in 4 MINN. PRACTICE, JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES III to be published by West Publishing Co. in 1985. Permission to
reprint this instruction from the Minnesota District Judges Association and West Publish-
ing Co. is gratefully acknowledged.
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8. The severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant
may be subject.
You may award punitive damages against a master or principal
because of an act done by an agent only if you find that:
1. The principal authorized the doing and the manner of the
act, or
2. The agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in em-
ploying him, or
3. The agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of employment, or
4. The principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified
or approved the act.
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